From Plato and Aristotle to Cicero, we observe a radical change in the understanding of classical natural right. By contrast to his two predecessors, Cicero doesn’t seem to harbor any doubt about the salutary character of some philosophical doctrine of natural right for the political community. In his dialogue The Laws, we see Cicero having recourse to the notion of a rational or natural law to defend and justify his own slightly improved version of the ancient Roman Republic’s legal code. Since the notion of a “natural law” also appears in Cicero’s Republic(cf. I.17 and 3.22), Cicero has often been considered as one of the first thurifers of this controversial notion. In this paper, we focus exclusively on Cicero’s presentation of the natural law in his dialogue The Laws. After replacing Cicero’s treatment of the natural law in its specific context, we argue that in his Laws, Cicero’s defends two different notions of the natural law: 1) the natural law strictly speaking which is the preserve of the wise man, a law whose only command is that the wise man should rule over the unwise; 2) the natural law understood as the theoretical support of the gentleman’s moral decency. In this last sense, the natural law is disconnected from any real knowledge of the whole, and becomes as a consequence a very problematic concept.